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A. INTRODUCTION 
Professor Steven Schwarcz, Stanley A. Star Professor of Law and Business at Duke 
University, was Distinguished Visiting Professor at the UCL Faculty of Laws between 
mid-January to mid-May 2018. We invited him to an interview to discuss his extensive 
scholarship on financial regulation - in particular, relating to how financial regulation 
can ‘fix’ the problems of financial crises, such as the global financial crisis 2007-9. The 
interview took place on 28 March 2018 at Bentham House. Professor Schwarcz’s 
scholarship and thinking spans financial institutions, markets and systems regulation 
and the importance of incentive-based corporate law and regulation, presenting a rich 
tapestry of enduring insights for regulatory policy at their most fundamental levels. 
  Professor Schwarcz’s background in engineering and as a practitioner of 
bankruptcy and international financial law prior to entering academia uniquely 
positions him to view financial regulation from an alternative and functional 
perspective to address many of the problems in today’s financial markets. His analysis 
of legal issues has drawn on cross disciplinary insights from diverse fields such as 
economics and from the functioning of engineering systems. He has offered many 
creative and practical suggestions and solutions to addressing systemic risk, which has 
risen in prominence as a topic for regulatory discussion in the wake of the global 
financial crisis. He has also written extensively on a whole range of topics including 
                                                          
* Both authors / interviewers are LLM students (2017-2018) at UCL. The interview process was 
conducted with guidance and support from Professor Iris H-Y Chiu, Professor of Corporate Law and 
Financial Regulation, UCL Faculty of Laws. 
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microprudential regulation,1 bank resolution,2 shadow banking,3 ring-fencing,4 
securitisation, restructurings and securities disclosure issues. Professor Schwarcz was 
engaged on some of these points in the course of the interview.  
This paper is presented in the format of an interview, but the text is a (non-
verbatim) transcription and not a replication of the conversation, as the interview was 
not recorded. In terms of the interviewers, Sriram is represented by ‘S’, while Xueming 
is represented by ‘X’. Professor Schwarcz is represented by ‘P’. 
 
A. THE CONVERSATION 
S: You have emphasised the need for regulators not to confuse and conflate the goals 
of microprudential and macroprudential regulation. Capital adequacy (and the Basel 
framework) is primarily a microprudential regulatory concept to ensure the continuity 
of a firm by correcting a market failure related to risk management (not having 
sufficient capital to absorb unexpected losses). However, the same is often offered as a 
regulatory solution in connection with limiting the impact of systemic risk (a 
macroprudential concern which should be focused on ensuring the protection of the 
financial system’s capacity to function as a network) and even in the context of curbing 
                                                          
1 Regulatory standards requiring the levels of risks (including credit risk, market risk and operational 
risk) taken by banks to be supported by the holding of defined minimum levels of capital have been 
periodically issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision of the Bank for International 
Settlements in the form of soft law instruments. These have mainly come in three iterations so far – Basel 
I (1988), Basel II (2004) and Basel III (2010) – and have resulted in broad global harmonisation in the 
holding of adequate minimum levels of capital by banks. This form of regulation has generally been 
referred to as ‘microprudential’ regulation that is primarily aimed at ensuring ‘capital adequacy’ at the 
level of individual banks in line with the levels of risks they take. See generally, Bank for International 
Settlements, ‘History of the Basel Committee’ <https://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm> accessed 14 June 
2018. 
2 Bank resolution is the process by which a regulator (the resolution authority) can step in to make sure 
that a bank that is failing does so in an orderly way. This is viewed as one of the strategies to counteract 
the ‘too big to fail’ conundrum faced by global regulators during the global financial crisis that began in 
2008. See generally, Bank of England, ‘Resolution’ (Bank of England, 26 July 2018) 
<https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/resolution> accessed 11 September 2018 and Jon 
Cunliffe, ‘Ending Too Big to Fail: How Best to Deal with Failed Large Banks’ (Bank of England, 05 
December 2016) <https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/article/2016/ending-too-big-to-
fail-how-best-to-deal-with-failed-large-banks> accessed 14 June 2018. 
3 Shadow banking refers to the activities of financial intermediaries (other than traditionally recognised 
banks) who perform maturity, liquidity and credit transformation without access to central bank liquidity. 
They have historically been characterised by light regulation or even by a lack of regulation as their 
activities may fall outside the conventional commercial banking systems. Shadow banks include entities 
such as hedge funds. See generally, Steven Schwarcz, ‘Regulating Shadow Banking’ (2011-2012) 31 
Review of Banking & Financial Law 619. 
4 Ring-fencing is a form of structural reform that separates banks’ retail banking activities from their 
wholesale and investment banking activities. The key goals are to protect the stability of the financial 
system and to reduce reliance on taxpayer-funded bailouts of banks. See generally, Bank of England, 
‘Structural Reform’ (Bank of England, 10 August 2018) <https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/prudential-
regulation/key-initiatives/structural-reform> accessed 11 September 2018. 
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excessive risk taking by banks in the context of the ‘too big to fail’ moral hazard debate 
(something you have questioned in your writing). What do you think is the reason 
for capital adequacy to have this wide and universal appeal in providing a ready 
basis for regulatory solutions? 
 
P: It is often assumed that microprudential regulation, which regulates individual 
institutions’ risk management and safety, would on the whole contribute to 
macroprudential safety, i.e. the safety of financial systems as a whole. Protecting 
individual firms is insufficient because financial systems may also fail due to market or 
infrastructural failure. Regulators nonetheless tend to rely on microprudential 
regulation as capital adequacy has been traditionally developed to mitigate the moral 
hazard of having a federal deposit insurance scheme. Such regulation is path dependent 
to an extent, and as Mokal argues,5 can even be counterproductive if individual 
institutions engage in similar behaviour due to microprudential regulatory requirements 
and collectively contribute to correlation risks.  
 
Very high levels of capital adequacy such as the levels touted by the Federal Reserve 
of Minneapolis (at 25% of risk weighted assets) can be very costly for banks. By 
analogy, one should think about how regulation could address fire hazard in housing. 
Regulation provides for well-equipped and trained fire departments and educates 
people on fire hazards. But to require every house to be completely fire proof is likely 
too costly.6 
 
S: The EU and the UK continue to believe in reforms to microprudential regulation but 
have now introduced a new regime, which is based on total loss-absorbing capacity 
(“TLAC”) as devised by the Basel-based Financial Stability Board. The EU has 
implemented TLAC in the form of minimum requirement for own funds and eligible 
liabilities (“MREL”). TLAC/MREL require banks to hold much more loss-absorbing 
                                                          
5 Rizwaan Mokal, ‘Liquidity, Systemic Risk, and the Bankruptcy Treatment of Financial Contracts’ 
(2015) 10 Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law 15. 
6 Steven Schwarcz, ‘Too Big to Fool: Moral Hazard, Bailouts, and Corporate Responsibility’ Minnesota 
Law Review (forthcoming) <https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3677> accessed 14 
June 2018. 
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capital, to an unprecedented extent. Do you foresee any significant risks for going 
down this regulatory path? 
 
P: These are forms of proactive resolution-based management. We have three ways to 
manage financial institution bankruptcies in theory: one is reactive, depending on the 
insolvency laws of the country dealing with the bankrupt institution after the fact or 
liquidating it in an orderly manner; one is proactive, which will identify ailing 
institutions and bring in mechanisms to avert failure; and the third is counteractive 
management which attempts to prevent problems from arising in the first place. Where 
proactive bankruptcy management is concerned, TLAC relies on contingent convertible 
instruments to convert debtholders into equity holders so that financial institutions are 
able to write off or pay back liabilities. This and other resolution-based regimes in 
general can be very positive reforms. We cannot pretend that financial crises or 
institutional failure can be avoided, and ex post forms of regulation that address the 
mitigation of harmful effects are invaluable.7 
 
S: In your writings you have given prominence to the role of a privatised fund (based 
on a system of taxation of systemically important market participants) to provide 
liquidity support as a functional macroprudential regulatory technique to tackle the 
impact of systemic risk. You have also mentioned a privatised industry-collected fund 
in the context of conducting any unavoidable bailouts that occur despite the imposition 
of a corporate governance based public law duty to align public and private sector 
benefits/costs. What do you foresee are the practical barriers to such private funds 
coming into existence as a way to deal with systemic risk and are any of the 
regulators in the US or elsewhere working on such an approach? 
 
P: A privatised systemic risk fund could be immensely useful as banks contribute to 
this, and could call upon this in times of need. This is similar to a mutualised risk sharing 
mechanism like the one I have discussed in relation to the mutualisation of risk 
performed by central counterparties for derivative contracts. The same idea, that a 
central body mutualises risk-bearing and is able to address the manifestation of systemic 
                                                          
7 Iman Anabtawi and Steven Schwarcz, ‘Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the Inevitability of 
Financial Failure’ (2013) 92 Texas Law Review 75. 
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problems that collectively affect everyone, applies to all financial instruments.8 If 
systemically important financial institutions all contribute to this fund, they are 
incentivised to monitor each other and this can improve risk management behaviour 
over all. This type of fund was originally proposed in the Dodd Frank bill but was not 
ultimately included as the existence of the fund is argued to entail moral hazard on the 
part of financial institutions, a point with which I do not agree. 
 
S: We are still concerned with the systemic risk impact posed by financial institutions 
especially if they are ‘too big to fail’. Does the UK reform to ring-fence retail banks 
work? In the context of ‘ring-fencing’ (as a method to break the transmission of 
systemic risk) you have argued that this technique may be more suitable to ensure 
continuity of service in a market for provision of a critical non-competitive service such 
as an essential utility service which has few providers while banking is fundamentally 
competitive and other banks could step in. Contrary to such an approach, now that 
the UK has gone with ring-fencing (following the Vickers report9) and its 
implementation is currently in place to be completed by next year by creating a 
barrier between the ‘risky’ and ‘non risky’ parts of the bank, do you think there 
are any significant risks (even if in the nature of unintended consequences) for the 
UK in this regard by the adoption of ring- fencing? 
 
P: The systemic risk profile of a bank depends in part on size, interconnectedness with 
other financial institutions and the substitutability of its services. When visiting Oxford 
in 2010, I advised John Vickers in his report to the government on financial reforms in 
the UK. Ring-fencing makes sense in the UK because the UK banking sector is 
concentrated in the hands of a few high street banks and their retail banking services 
may not be readily substitutable. Hence ring-fencing to protect those services is 
                                                          
8 Steven Schwarcz, ‘Central Clearing of Financial Contracts: Theory and Regulatory Implications’ 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review (forthcoming) 
<https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3778> accessed 14 June 2018. 
9 Tim Edmonds, ‘The Independent Commission on Banking: The Vickers Report & the Parliamentary 
Committee on Banking Standards’ (2013) Commons Briefing Papers SN06171 
<http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN06171#fullreport> accessed 14 
June 2018. The Vickers Commission proposed a fundamental change in the way that banks in the UK 
are organised. According to Edmonds: “The main change is that a 'ring-fence' would separate retail 'utility 
' banking work from a range of investment banking and corporate finance activities.” 
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important. This does not apply to the US as the banking sector is not concentrated and 
with the multitude of banks in the competing space, substitutability is not an issue. 
 
A more widely applicable form of ex ante regulation to address financial institution 
risk-taking and risk of failure lies in aligning bank managers’ incentives with a sense 
of public duty or responsibility.10 Bank managers account to shareholders in the 
shareholder primacy system, and they are incentivised to take risks to maximise 
shareholder return even if that externalises costs onto the public. The public (other than 
specifically imposed laws) and stakeholders have no standing to call bank managers to 
account. Hence we need to think about imposing a duty of public governance upon bank 
managers. [This is further elaborated in response to the final question of the interview 
below.] The regime for directors’ duties can be reformed in the way suggested in my 
article titled Too Big to Fool: Moral Hazard, Bailouts, and Corporate Responsibility.11 
 
X: Would the introduction of a public governance duty for bank directors create conflict 
in relation to their other duties to shareholders? 
 
P: Law reform is needed in order to introduce such a duty for bank directors, and we 
essentially need to rethink and overhaul corporate law doctrines in order to do so.12  
 
S: Should there be regulation on an ex ante basis to address complexity in financial 
engineering, which can give rise to regulatory arbitrage, opaque levels of risk-taking 
and potential risks to financial systems? When faced with increasing complexity in 
financial engineering what is your view on how best to handle it from a regulatory 
perspective? Andrew Haldane from the BoE (in ‘the Dog and the Frisbee’ speech13) has 
argued to not fight complexity with further complexity in regulation, a view 
Avgouleas14 shares in the context of Basel capital adequacy calculations which could 
lead to uncertainty. But reliance on pure, convenient heuristics and rules of thumb in 
decision making (such as the blind and flawed reliance on credit ratings in the structured 
                                                          
10 Schwarcz, ‘Too Big to Fool’ (n 6). 
11 ibid. 
12 ibid. 
13 Andrew Haldane, ‘The dog and the frisbee’ (BIS, 31 August 2012) 
<https://www.bis.org/review/r120905a.pdf> accessed 14 June 2018.  
14 Emilios Avgouleas, Governance of Global Financial Markets: The Law, the Economics, the Politics 
(Cambridge University Press 2012) 144. 
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finance market) may also not be advisable. What is your view on the key 
ideas/attributes any framework ought to have in dealing with complexity in 
financing engineering? 
 
P: Complexity poses the greatest challenge to financial regulation. However, we should 
be mindful of stifling useful innovation. The EU’s series of reforms to make securitised 
products simple, transparent and standardised is a great initiative as it allows a useful 
product to continue to be marketed but incentivises certain features that would better 
meet the needs of financial stability. We cannot completely prevent failures and 
problems in the financial system, so a large dose of ex post regulation is needed such 
as resolution regimes and a privatised systemic risk fund as discussed earlier. In relation 
to ex ante regulation I have focused on decision-making and incentives in financial 
institutions, for example in relation to a directors’ public governance duty. 
 
X: Would more disclosure regulation be useful to reduce complexity in financial 
engineering? 
 
P: Complexity likely results in copious amounts of disclosure, which people may not 
read or process. In a separate piece,15 I have argued that it is very difficult to regulate 
in such a way that overcomes people’s behavioural irrationalities and tendency to over-
rely on heuristics. 
 
S: A final question on a matter of pre-emptive (ie ex ante) financial regulation related 
to shadow banking. You have drawn attention to the existing inadequacies prevalent in 
the regulation applicable to shadow banking. You envisage ideal regulation to be able 
to both: (i) in an ex ante manner, bring out the best in shadow banking (by functional 
regulation aimed at increasing its efficiency by addressing information failure, 
rationality failure, principal-agent and incentive issues); and (ii) in an after-the-fact or 
ex post manner, limit the impact its activities can have on systemic risk. Could you 
please elaborate a little more on the use of the ex ante strategies you have in mind? 
 
                                                          
15 Steven Schwarcz, ‘Regulating Complacency: Human Limitations and Legal Efficacy’ (2018) 93 Notre 
Dame Law Review 1073. 
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P: Shadow banking institutions can be systemically important. Some of them are 
largely owned and managed by the same individuals, such as highly interconnected 
hedge funds. Owner-managers have huge incentives to take significant amounts of risk, 
as the rewards can be substantial. I proposed in a paper16 that perhaps limited liability 
for such owner-managers should be modified, so that they become more responsible for 
decision-making, as they may be liable to their investors. The double liability rule 
existed in law for banks prior to the Great Depression, but was abolished for the wrong 
reason after the Great Depression. This reform, together with the public governance 
duty I propose,17 could greatly transform incentives in risk management and decision-
making in financial institutions. In an earlier piece,18 I argued that not only should 
senior managers’ incentives be aligned with the long-term viability of the financial 
institution, such as through clawback of remuneration, but middle managers should be 
subject to the same regime of remuneration regulation as they often effectively make 
the key decisions in relation to complex deals and investment. These ex ante reforms, 
governing incentives in financial institutions, could go a long way towards achieving 
healthy systemic effects in the long-term. 
 
C. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
As this interview has hopefully illustrated, Professor Schwarcz seamlessly mixes 
boldness in critically challenging mainstream ideas with the humility required to first 
acknowledge the fallibility and fragility of the financial system. This enables him to 
find creative and practical solutions to systemic problems. His work shows us the 
proverbial ‘other side of the coin’ in such matters. He teaches us that the popular ideas 
of an age such as the focus on the ‘too big to fail’ conundrum, ring-fencing and the use 
of contingent convertible capital may have won favour with regulatory policy for the 
time being but the analysis may not have been complete. He shows us that the traditional 
focus on the shareholder/manager conflict of interest paradigm may not necessarily be 
the right framework of analysis on matters related to bank bailouts. Instead, he 
conceives a new corporate governance duty to bind directors to align private and public 
sector interests as a way to minimise externalities to contain bailouts. He also invokes 
                                                          
16 Steven Schwarcz, ‘The Governance Structure of Shadow Banking: Rethinking Assumptions about 
Limited Liability’ (2014) 90 Notre Dame Law Review 1. 
17 Schwarcz, ‘Too Big to Fool’ (n 6). 
18 Steven Schwarcz, ‘Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-Management Agency 
Costs’ (2009) 26(2) Yale Journal on Regulation 457. 
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the use of a private Systemic Risk Fund (to which banks contribute) to address 
necessary bailouts and in containing the impact of systemic risk. 
Impressively, using a cross-disciplinary analytical technique, Professor 
Schwarcz leans on chaos theory and the functioning of engineering systems to focus on 
systemic risk. He dwells on limiting the impact of and breaking the transmission of 
systemic risk more than containing the rise of systemic risk. A complete elimination of 
such risks arising in the first place may not ever be possible. The complexity, 
interconnectedness and (lack of) substitutability associated with financial markets and 
market participants in today’s age is too great to keep the ‘genie in the bottle’ (of 
systemic risk) from escaping.  Professor Schwarcz shows us the role of 
financial regulation in shaping incentives at every link in financial systems and markets 
so as to manage risks at an acceptable level. Significantly, he demonstrates that 
the impact and transmission of inevitable systemic problems can be addressed in a 
practical and functional manner. 

